Applying Political Theory to International Law by Hoffmann, Stanley
Applying Political Theory to
International Law
Justifying International Acts. By Lea Brilmayer.* Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1989. Pp. x, 164. $19.95.
Stanley Hoffmann t
Professor Brilmayer's book examines the justification of a government's
activities beyond the borders of the state. She notes, correctly, that classical
"horizontal" theories of international law that focus on the relations
among states cannot cope adequately with what she calls "diagonal rela-
tionships," by which she means "state-individual relations with interna-
tional overtones," such as the relation of a state to a nonresident guest
worker, or to human beings whose rights are violated in their home coun-
try and whom the foreign state tries to protect.' She shows that neither
"state-moralists"-for whom international law ethics are a matter of
states' rights-nor realists-who doubt the relevance of ethical considera-
tions in foreign policy and the effectiveness of international law-have
much to say about such links. Further, she argues that cosmopolitans-for
whom borders have no moral significance-practice their own brand of
horizontalism, as they see the world as a net of inter-personal relations
across borders.2 She also deplores the failure of political theory to explore
issues of transnational relations, and its tendency to focus almost exclu-
sively on "the question of domestic political legitimacy," that is, a citizen's
obligation to obey his or her own government, rather than on non-citizens'
rights and duties.
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Her attempt to remedy these failings is "vertical analysis." Her thesis is
simple (and repeated many times): "a state's actions outside its territory
. . . must be evaluated in terms of the political justification that grants
that state the right to operate domestically."4 Thus, "all transjurisdictional
relations . . . should be analyzed in terms of domestic political theory."'
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She explains that she is engaged, not in a "first-order enterprise" that
adopts the premises of a given political theory and draws "from them
conclusions about the legitimate scope of state coercion in international
relations," but in a "second-order inquiry" which merely draws out the
implications of the "vertical thesis's consistency requirement" (the re-
quirement that the same "constituting political theory" grant a state au-
thority to act at home and abroad).
6
Unfortunately, despite the clear and elegant writing and subtle analytic
intelligence displayed throughout the volume, it is not at all clear that the
vertical thesis gets us any farther than the domestic and international the-
ories whose shortcomings Brilmayer so accurately picked out. Indeed, the
volume struck this reviewer as a bundle of contradictions. Why, in the
first place, can't the state's "constituting political theory" itself sharply
distinguish between the principles of legitimacy at home and the princi-
ples to be applied in the thoroughly different international milieu? (The
United States Supreme Court has granted the President far greater pow-
ers abroad than at home). Is not the absence of a sovereign above the
states relevant to the distinction between "diagonal" relationships and the
other set of vertical ones, state-citizen relations? Moreover, Brilmayer de-
votes a whole chapter7 (in my opinion, her best) to what she calls the
boundary assumptions of domestic political theory. She asserts that every
theory of domestic legitimacy, such as explicit or tacit consent or accept-
ance of benefits, turns "on implicit assumptions about the boundaries of
sovereignty," 8 that is, assumptions about territoriality: "all theories of po-
litical obligation depend on the existing distribution" of territory.9 If this
is the case, as she convincingly argues, then why should the same justifica-
tion be required for acts within the boundaries and for acts without? Is
there not a strange coincidence or convergence in oversimplification be-
tween this requirement of consistency and the "horizontal" world view of
cosmopolitan theorists?
Brilmayer would deny it, since she insists that her "metatheoretical"
endeavor allows each state to have its own theory of legitimacy, and
merely demands "theoretical consistency between domestic justification
and international coercion."' 0 But this is an untenable position. Indeed,
Brilmayer dismisses one objection to vertical analysis, "that it grants too
much power to a state that was founded on an unprincipled domestic po-
litical theory"" (for instance a theory that justifies aggression, or interfer-
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between a valid political theory and one that is merely held sincerely."' 2
But in order to decide which is valid and which is not, or to "resolve
conflicts between states with fundamentally different political systems,"' 3
one needs a metatheory that will supply "the criteria for evaluating politi-
cal actions," 4 and thereby determine which "constituting political theo-
ries"'" are philosophically and existentially acceptable and which are not.
If, as Brilmayer does in this volume, one refuses to do so, then it is not
surprising that the analysis of such vital issues as non-intervention, af-
firmative duties, and humanitarian intervention provides the reader with
so little guidance and leaves her with very little that is fresh. "At each
step in this inquiry there are difficult issues of domestic political theory.
The vertical thesis only serves to formulate them, not to answer them."' 6
Certainly! But then, why claim so much for it?
If the only point of this thesis is that "arguments from political theory
are relevant to international relations because they both deal with the
same issue: the legitimacy of state power,"'" few will quarrel with
Brilmayer. If the point, however, is that because "extremely difficult is-
sues" of diagonal relations are "the analogs for issues that domestic politi-
cal philosophers do, or should, address," then "as a matter of interna-
tional law, the problem disappears,"' 8 one can only dissent: This is a non
sequitur. Indeed, it is less arduous to find a rationale for, say, humanita-
rian intervention, or for limits to the duties of distributive justice across
borders, in an international political philosophy that takes into account
both the rights of human beings and the special bonds of citizenship in a
world of territorial states, than in the tortuous and inconclusive vertical
thesis. Domestic political theory is all too able, even when it is not blithely
inconsistent, either to justiJ, every kind of coercive act across borders, or
to exclude all coercive or all beneficial acts abroad, or to argue for a radi-
cal discontinuity between state-citizen and state-noncitizen relations.
Thus, it risks providing even less guidance than traditional "horizontal"
international theories.
Finally, Brilmayer argues that the vertical limitations of state acts
"arise out of political theory, not out of an analogy to personal ethics,"
whereas "even when contemporary theory does move away from the hori-
zontal paradigm, it does not evaluate state actions in terms of political
theory but in terms of personal morality or ethics."' 9 Ethics, in her view,
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a horizontal relationship."2 This is highly questionable: first, because it
erects an excessively high barrier between normative political theory and
ethics (politics, to be sure, is the realm of coercion, but coercion is quite
properly subject to ethical judgment), and second because it distinguishes
far too rigidly "states" from "people." States are (certain) people commit-
ting certain acts, and ethics deals not only with "horizontal" and personal
relations but with hierarchical relations and collective acts as well. Fur-
thermore, if Brilmayer is right, why does she say that her book claims
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